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FORGIVING PRINCIPAL IN A
PURCHASE PRICE REDUCTION
— by Neil E. Harl*
 For purchasers of property unable to make payments as
required by the obligation, a purchase price reduction may be
a possible solution.1  If the debt of an original purchaser of
property2 is reduced by the original seller of the property, the
adjustment is treated as a purchase price adjustment and not
as a discharge of indebtedness if the debtor is solvent.3
Buyer's Concerns
The most serious problems from the buyer's point of
view are that investment tax credit originally claimed on the
property may be proportionately recaptured regardless of the
elapsed time since the property was considered to have been
placed in service by the buyer4 and an adjustment must be
made in the buyer's income tax basis for the property.  If
some assets have been depreciated out or depreciated below a
level permitting a proportionate reduction in basis for all
assets involved, the outcome is not completely clear.
Neither the regulations nor the statute provide a direct answer
to the question.5
•  One argument is that the taxpayer has income to the
extent the basis reduction allocable to a depreciable item
exceeds the basis in the item at the time of basis reduction.6
•  The other argument, under the assumption that relief
provisions should be construed reasonably to achieve the
relief objectives, is that the basis would be reduced using the
relative adjusted basis figures at the time of basis reduction
with relatively greater basis reduction for land and other
nondepreciable assets.7
Seller's Income Tax Liability
A seller who agrees to a purchase price adjustment may
have income from reduction of the obligation.8  That is
because of the 1980 amendment specifying that cancellation
or forgiveness of an installment obligation is treated as a
disposition by the holder.9  If the obligor is a related party,
the amount taken into account as a disposition triggering
recognition of unreported gain attributable to the obligation
is  not   less   than   the   face   amount  of  the  installment
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obligation.10  Thus, the entire amount of reduction is treated
as though received by the seller.11   In the event the parties
are not related12 any gain is determined by the fair market
value of the obligation. 13  Presumably, the fair market
value of the obligation would reflect the value of the
underlying asset unless the buyer holds other assets reachable
by creditors.
Despite the 1980 amendment, IRS nonetheless held in a
1987 private letter ruling that a seller agreeing to a purchase
price reduction did not have recognizable gain where the
forgiveness of principal was to help a financially troubled
buyer.14  The ruling ignored the 1980 change in the law and
instead cited to pre-1980 revenue rulings.15  That ruling has
been criticized16 although the 1987 ruling continues to be
the only statement of IRS position on the issue.  Quite
clearly, the 1987 ruling is highly favorable to sellers
forgiving debt.
Use With Other Provisions
Neither the statute nor the regulations are clear as to
whether purchase price reduction can be used in tandem with
other relief provisions.  In a 1990 private letter ruling, IRS
approved a reduction of tax attributes under the insolvent
debtor rule17 followed by a purchase price reduction.18  This
ruling adds to the list of planning strategies available for use
by taxpayers facing actual or imminent default on
installment obligations.
FOOTNOTES
1 See I.R.C. § 108(e)(5). See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural
Law § 39.03[8] (1992).
2 IRS has approved a reduction following a tax-free
corporate exchange under I.R.C. § 351, however.  Ltr.
Rul. 9037033, June 18, 1990.
3 I.R.C. § 108(e)(5).
4 See Treas. Reg. § 1.47-2(c)(1).  I.R.C. § 1017(c)(2)
which protects against investment tax credit recapture
does not apply to a purchase price reduction.
5 See I.R.C. §§ 168, 1011, 1016, 1017.  See also Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.168-2(d)(3), Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1.
6 Cf. Est. of Delman v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a)(3).
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8 I.R.C. § 453B(f).
9 I.R.C. § 453B(f).
1 0 I.R.C. § 453B(f)(2).
1 1 Id.
1 2 See I.R.C. § 453B(f)(1).
1 3 I.R.C. §§ 453B(f)(1), 453B(a)(2).
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 8739045, June 30, 1987.
1 5 See Rev. Rul. 55-429, 1955-2 C.B. 252; Rev. Rul. 68-
419, 1968-2 C.B. 196.
1 6 See Harl, "Forgiveness of Principal of Installment
Obligations," 10 J. Agr. Tax'n & Law 67 (1988).
1 7 See I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(B).  See generally 4 Harl, supra n.
1, § 39.03[5].
1 8 Ltr. Rul. 9037033, June 18, 1990.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  The debtor failed to list a state income
tax refund on the bankruptcy estate property schedules,
including amended schedules and during creditors'
examinations.  The district court had held that the failure to
list the property did not subject the debtor to denial of a
discharge because the tax refunds were exempt property.
The appellate court held that the exempt nature of the
refunds was immaterial because the debtor never listed the
property and never claimed an exemption.  The appellate
court denied the debtor's discharge because the failure was
substantial, over $1,300, and repeated, demonstrating intent
to omit the assets from the bankruptcy estate.  Mertz v .
Rott, 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
BUSINESS HOMESTEAD.  The debtor operated a retail
automotive parts business at two locations in the same city.
The court held that the debtor was entitled to a business
homestead exemption only as to one of the businesses under
Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 51.  In re  Webb, 954 F.2d
1102 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g unrep. D. Ct. dec.
rev'g , 119 B.R. 114 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor owned a residence with a
nondebtor spouse as tenants by the entireties.  The debtor
claimed the homestead exemption and sought to avoid a
judicial lien against the debtor's interest in the residence as
impairing the exemption. The court held that the debtor
could not claim an exemption in the debtor's contingent
survivorship interest in the residence where the trustee did
not seek to sell the residence.  In re  Dick, 136 B . R .
1000 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).
The debtors, husband and wife, owned a residence as
tenants by the entireties and claimed the homestead
exemption.  The debtors sought to avoid a joint judicial lien
against the homestead as impairing the homestead
exemption.  The court held that the judicial lien could be
avoided.  In re  Maino, 136 B.R. 1006 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1992).
The debtor and nondebtor spouse owned a residence as
tenants by the entireties and the trustee sought to sell the
house to obtain the debtor's share of the proceeds for the
bankruptcy estate.  The court allowed the sale because the
debtor failed to provide any evidence of adverse effect upon
the nondebtor spouse.  In re  Grabowski, 137 B.R. 1
(S.D. N.Y. 1992).
PENSION PLANS.  The court held that ERISA did not
preempt the pension plan exemption in Mo. Rev. Stat. §
513.490(10)(e).  In re  Vickers, 954 F.2d 1426 (8th
Cir. 1992), aff'g , 126 B.R. 348 (W.D. M o .
1991), aff'g , 116 B.R. 149 (Bankr. W.D. M o .
1990) .
PROVISIONS.  The Chapter 13 farm debtors claimed
2,400 bushels of corn as exempt under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
25-1556, as six months of provisions for the debtors'
family.  The court held that the corn did not qualify for the
exemption because the corn would not be eaten by the
family but sold for cash.  Matter of Dana, 136 B . R .
813 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
SETOFF .  Warehouse creditors who had stored cotton
owned by the debtor sought setoff of the proceeds of the
cotton against storage and other costs resulting from the
previous storage of the debtor's cotton.  The creditors argued
that the cotton stored at the time of filing of bankruptcy
represented a pre-petition debt to the debtor which could be
setoff against the storage charges owed by the debtor to the
creditors pre-petition.  The court held that the warehouses
were bailees of the cotton stored at the time of the
bankruptcy filing; therefore, no debt was owed to the debtor
pre-petition and no setoff was allowed.  The court also
denied recovery to the creditors under an equitable
recoupment theory for the same reasons as denial of the
setoff.  In re  Julien, 136 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W . D .
Tenn. 1992).
  CHAPTER 12  
DISMISSAL.  The debtor had filed a Chapter 12 plan
and had received confirmation but had not completed the
plan when the debtor filed a Chapter 11 case in another
jurisdiction.  The court held that the filing of a second case
while an existing case was still open was not in good faith
and dismissed the Chapter 11 case and imposed costs on the
debtors.  In re  Befort, 137 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D .
Kan. 1992).
SETTLEMENT.  The Chapter 12 debtor reached an
agreement in settlement of claims by a creditor bank and had
the agreement read into the court record.  After the debtor
learned that the bank official with whom the debtor
negotiated was sued by the bank for wrongful acts, the
debtor moved for withdrawal of approval of the agreement.
The court held that although the wrongful acts of the bank
official may have made the agreement unfair to the debtor,
the substantial costs to the estate and other creditors from
rejecting the agreement required that the agreement be
enforced.  The court also found that the debtor had not
